Abstract-We argue that the rise of online travel agencies changed the nature of competition in the airline industry-from competition on elapsed scheduled flight times to price competition. Using flight-level data between 1997 and 2007 and geographical Internet growth patterns, we find a positive relationship between Internet access and flight times. The magnitude of this relationship is larger in competitive markets without low-cost carriers and for flights with shortest scheduled times. We also find that flight delays increased as more passengers gained Internet access. These findings suggest that the Internet may adversely affect firms' performance and incentives to provide high-quality products.
I. Introduction
H OW do improvements in information availability affect markets? Economists have long emphasized that price information is critical for the efficient functioning of markets. The growth of electronic commerce and Internet marketplaces has been considered as contributing to market efficiency because it has enabled consumers to compare prices across hundreds of vendors with much less effort than would be required in the physical world (Brown & Goolsbee, 2002) . Indeed, the traditional economic view suggests that the Internet makes markets more competitive, thereby leading firms to reduce prices. But besides setting lower prices, are there other ways in which firms have responded to the changes in the competitive landscape (Ellison & Ellison, 2009 )? Could more price information also lead firms to offer lower product quality? Could more information change the market equilibrium in ways that make performance less important? Our paper aims to address these questions by highlighting subtle ways in which the diffusion of the Internet has affected performance and product quality in the airline industry. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that has examined the relationship between performance and product quality and Internet access or search costs in general.
The U.S. airline industry provides a natural setting for examining the effect of the Internet. The distribution of airline tickets has undergone dramatic changes over the past fifteen years as more air passengers have gained Internet access. In 1997 only 0.5% of U.S. domestic airline tickets were purchased online, whereas in 2007, between 50% and 60% of tickets were purchased online (Berry & Jia, 2010) . Previous research has also shown that Internet use is strongly associated with lower airfares (Orlov, 2011) and that over 35% of traditional brick-and-mortar travel agencies left their markets between 1997 and 2003 as more air passengers began to use the Internet to purchase airline tickets (Goldmanis et al., 2010) .
We use the scheduled elapsed flight time, that is, the amount of time between the scheduled departure and the scheduled arrival, as our main measure for performance. Figure 1 plots a time series for the mean scheduled flight times between 1990 and 2007. The time series fluctuates in the early 1990s and then shows a strong upward trend starting in the second half of the 1990s. We argue that the shift in airfare distribution channels from traditional travel agencies to online distribution channels can explain about a quarter to half of this upward trend. In the early 1990s, when brick-and-mortar travel agencies sold over 80% of airline tickets (Borenstein, 1992) , flights typically appeared on the travel agent's screen in ascending order according to their scheduled durations (GAO, 1995) . Given that travel agents booked over 80% of flights from the first screen and that the majority of the tickets were sold from the first line of search results, airlines had strong incentives to maintain short scheduled flying times (Guerin-Calvert, 1992 ). This incentive changed as the Internet became the most common channel for purchasing airline tickets and flight duration was no longer the main criterion to sort flights. In other words, the Internet has changed the way airlines compete for customers, creating a shift from an environment in which airlines compete to appear at the top of travel agents' computer screens by scheduling the shortest flights, to an environment where price plays the dominant role in selling tickets and scheduled time is not as important. Consistent with this view, a senior executive at American Airlines said, ''[Before the Internet] you had to be on the first screen [of the travel agent]. All the booking came off the first screen. You'd bring your airplanes in as fast as you can and you'd let them go as fast as you can. [When most tickets are sold online] it's important still to have competitive elapsed time, because there's a point at which consumers will say no. But it isn't important to have the fastest elapsed time.'' 1 As flight duration times became less important in affecting revenues, airlines could schedule longer flights and reduce costly fuel consumption and other related costs (Forbes, Lederman, & Tombe, forthcoming.) 2
To substantiate our claim, we investigate the relationship between increases in Internet use and scheduled elapsed flight times using several sources of flight-level data over the years 1997 to 2007. Our analysis exploits four main sources of variation in the data: (a) differences in Internet penetration over time, (b) differences in Internet penetration across geographical locations, (c) differences in competition levels across flight segments (a flight segment is a directional nonstop route between two airports), and (d) differences in flight times within flight segments. These sources of variation allow us to estimate the marginal effect of Internet penetration on flight duration and investigate whether the size of the effect varies across flight segments with different levels of competition, We expect that the effect of the Internet on scheduled flight duration will be greater in competitive markets because airlines were especially likely to schedule short flights in these markets when traditional travel agents were the dominant distribution channel. For instance, consider two Boeing 727 Delta flights departing on the same day from Atlanta International Airport. One flight flies to Boston and faces market competition, while the other flight is to Albuquerque and is a monopoly. We expect that a similar increase in Internet access for passengers on these flights will have a greater impact on flight duration in the competitive market to Boston than the corresponding effect on flight duration for the flight to Albuquerque.
Our identification strategy exploits the fact that connecting passengers or passengers returning to their home town likely bought their ticket in the metropolitan area where they began their trip, which is not necessarily the same area from which a given flight departs. Thus, we can compare the effect of the Internet on flights departing from the same airport on the same day but also carry different fractions of passengers who purchased their tickets elsewhere (i.e., in areas with different levels of access to the Internet). For instance, assume that half of the passengers from Atlanta to Boston and from Atlanta to Albuquerque purchased their tickets in Atlanta and that the other half bought their tickets at their origin town (Boston and Albuquerque, respectively). Because the Internet grew faster in Boston than in Albuquerque, we expect that a larger fraction of passengers on the flight to Boston purchased their ticket online compared to the corresponding fraction of passengers who bought tickets online on the flight to Albuquerque. Consequently, we expect that the effect of the Internet on the duration of the flight from Atlanta to Boston will be greater than the corresponding effect on flight duration of the flight from Atlanta to Albuquerque. By also incorporating various measures of congestion at the flight and the airport levels and a rich set of fixed effects, we believe that we are able to identify the impact of the Internet on scheduled elapsed flight times.
In our empirical analysis, we find that Internet use is associated with a significant increase in scheduled elapsed flight times. This effect is particularly large in competitive markets and can explain about half of the total increase in scheduled elapsed flight times. To further support our argument and rule out alternative explanations for the effect of the Internet on flight times, we also investigate two other settings in which the Internet likely affected airlines' incentives to use flight duration as a competitive tool. First, we focus on the flights with the shortest scheduled times in their origin-destination segments. We expect that the effect of the Internet on elapsed scheduled time will be larger for flights that previously appeared at the top of traditional travel agents' screens. Second, we focus on markets in which low-cost carriers offer service and exploit the fact that these carriers did not primarily rely on the traditional computer reservation systems to sell airfares. Accordingly, in markets with low-cost carriers, we expect scheduled elapsed flight time to be less important in the first place and the effect of the Internet on scheduled elapsed flight time to be weaker. In both settings, our regression results confirm our expectations.
We also use the same empirical strategy to examine the effect of the Internet on actual flight times and flight delays, a common measure for quality in the airline industry (Forbes, 2008; Mazzeo, 2003; Prince & Simon, 2009) . Our findings indicate a strong positive effect of the Internet on actual flight times. We also find that flight delays (the difference between actual and scheduled time) increased as more passengers likely purchased their tickets online. Taking into account the total effect of the Internet on flight times and delays, our estimates suggest that in competitive FIGURE 1.-AVERAGE SCHEDULED FLIGHT TIME, 1990 -2007 The average is calculated across directional nonstop segments that had at least five daily flights. Source: On-Time Performance database.
2 Flying at higher altitudes is more fuel efficient but requires flights to fly longer to reach the higher altitude. See http://online.wsj.com/article /SB10001424052748704901104575423261677748380.html.
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markets, the increase in Internet access contributed about 5.0 to 8.2 additional minutes in arrival delays and actual flight times, respectively. We discuss possible interpretations for these findings in section IV.
Our paper contributes to the voluminous literature on the effect of information and communication technologies on productivity and performance (Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012) . Naturally the existing literature predominantly focuses on the large benefits associated with the adoption of information and communication technologies. Our findings, however, highlight a potentially negative effect of the diffusion of online distribution channels on firms' incentives to invest in product quality and improving their performance. Furthermore, although our findings come from the airline industry, we believe that exploring how firms respond to consumers' tendency to purchase more visible options is relevant in many other settings of online search. Indeed, recent theoretical (Arbatskaya, 2007; Salant, 2011 ) and empirical (Oestreicher-Singer & Sundararajan, 2011) papers have shown that the prominence or visibility of a firm product affects firms' performance. Our findings also contribute to a growing literature on the effect of competition on performance and product quality (Hubbard, 2003; Matsa, 2011; Syverson, 2011) . Unlike most of the existing evidence, our results suggest that the effect of Internet access on measures of performance and product quality is negative, particularly in more competitive environments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we discuss the data sources. In sections III and IV, we describe our estimation and identification strategy and present the results. In section V, we discuss alternative explanations for our findings. We discuss and conclude in section VI.
II. Data
Our data come from several sources. Data on Internet use over time come from the Computer Use and Ownership Supplement to the Consumer Population Survey (CPS), which asks respondents about Internet use in 1997 Internet use in , 1998 Internet use in , 2000 Internet use in , 2001 Internet use in , 2003 Internet use in , and 2007 . We use the CPS to measure Internet penetration for each of the 243 major metropolitan areas in our data. In particular, we use sample weights provided by the CPS to compute the percentage of respondents with Internet access. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for this variable.
Our primary source of flight-level data is the on-time performance database from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. This database reports scheduled and actual flight information for all flights on each airline with at least 1% of U.S. domestic passenger revenues. In particular, the data include measures of scheduled and actual departure and arrival times, as well as identifying information for each aircraft and flight. Table 2 reports the average scheduled flight times and delays for the nine carriers that reported this information throughout the period we are investigating.
Another data source we use is the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) market database, which contains a 10% random sample of all domestic passenger tickets purchased in each quarter for each year of our sample. Importantly, the DB1B database includes the outbound and return portions of round-trip tickets, so we can identify each passenger's home airport (and therefore the associated metropolitan area in which he or she is likely to have purchased the ticket).
3 The distinction is important because our hypothesis is that the share of passengers who buy their tickets online (or have the option of doing so) affects airlines' scheduled elapsed flight times. Therefore, we calculate the following weighted measure of Internet penetration among the passengers on airline i serving flight segment j in quarter t:
where x ijkt is the share of all passengers on the flight who began their travel itinerary in airport k, IP mt is the Internet penetration in metropolitan area m, and I m k is an indicator that is equal to 1 if airport k is located in metropolitan area m and 0 otherwise. For example, consider a flight from Atlanta to Boston. Assume that 45% of the passengers are flying round trip from Atlanta to Boston (so they are on the outbound portion of their round-trip itinerary), another 35% of the passengers are flying round trip from Boston to 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2007 Atlanta (so they are on the return portion of their round-trip itinerary), and another 20% of the passengers are flying round trip from Tampa to Boston with a stop each way at Atlanta (so they are on the second segment of the outbound portion of their round-trip itinerary). The weighted average Internet penetration for passengers on this particular airline's flight from Atlanta to Boston is equal to 0.45 IP Atlanta þ 0.35 IP Boston þ 0.2 IP Tampa , where IP i denotes the Internet penetration in the metropolitan area in which the relevant airport is located. 4 Because different flights that originate from the same airport (e.g., Atlanta) carry passengers who began their journey in different locations, we expect that the Internet variable will be different. We also use the DB1B to calculate the mean airfare, which in some specifications we include as a control variable.
5
We supplement these data with additional sources. First, we use the Official Airline Guide (OAG), which publishes a complete set of scheduled flights for all airlines between all U.S. airports. We use the OAG data to construct the measures of competition for each flight segment in addition to several measures of aircraft operations in each airport and at different times throughout the day. In section IV, we provide further details on these measures, which enable us to control for potential changes in the number of flights and congestion patterns over time and across airports. In addition, we use these data to identify flights operated by lowcost carriers, as well as to investigate the effect of Internet access on the shortest scheduled flight times. Second, we use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to construct demographic and economic measures at the metropolitan-area level. These measures control for expected and unexpected demand changes that may be spuriously correlated with Internet penetration. Finally, we use the T100 (Form 41) database from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics to derive a directional carrier-flight segment load factor variable (i.e., how full that airline's flights are) on a particular flight segment for each month in our sample. Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for the variables that we construct from these data sets and use later in the estimation.
After matching these data sets, we limit our sample to traffic during one Thursday in each quarter in the years CPS data are available. We do not use data for the years for which CPS data are not available. We present estimation results for nine carriers for which data on on-time performance were available for all years between 1997 and 2007. We also limit our analysis to flight segments between the 100 airports with the highest numbers of passengers. This leaves us with 286,004 observations. The results are qualitatively similar if we do not constrain the data.
III. Identification and Empirical Specification
The explosion of e-commerce in recent years illustrates how the Internet is shaping the way consumers and businesses interact, affecting industry structure, and accelerating diffusion of information across firms and consumers. Nevertheless, identifying causal effects of the Internet on FIGURE 2.-AVERAGE SHORTEST SCHEDULED FLIGHT TIME, 1997 TIME, -2007 The average is calculated across directional nonstop segments that had at least five daily flights. Source: OAG. Source: OAG database.
4 We use the terms Internet access, Internet, and Internet penetration (IP) interchangeably. See Dana and Orlov (2014) for a similar use of this measure of Internet penetration. 5 The DB1B data set reports airfares at the itinerary level. We allocate this fare to each of the itinerary's segments proportional to segment's distance. We then compute the average of airfares on each segment. 6 The list of low-cost carriers includes Southwest Airlines, AirTran, JetBlue, Frontier, ATA Airlines, Allegiant Air, Skybus Airlines, Spirit Airlines, Sun Country Airlines, ValuJet Airlines, National Airlines, and Independence Air.
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firms' behavior has proved to be difficult. A common research design uses cross-sectional data with the key righthand-side variable being a measure of Internet use or Internet access. Such analyses suffer from potentially severe omitted-variable bias, because the adoption of the Internet is likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics of Internet adopters. Using panel data design in this study, we can potentially address this concern because we control for both cross-sectional differences correlated with Internet access as well as common changes over time. Identifying the marginal effect of the Internet using a panel data design may still be difficult if the observed changes in Internet penetration are small. We believe that the airline industry is well suited to address this concern. Our study focuses on a period in which Internet access grew rapidly, from an average metropolitan-area penetration level of 19.4% in 1997 to an average penetration level of 76.3% in 2007. This change is also reflected in the share of airline tickets sold online, rising from 0.5% in 1997 to 50% to 60% in 2007 (SITA, 2008) . Importantly, substantial variation in changes in Internet penetration across U.S. metropolitan areas over time (see table 1) provides additional identification power for our results. Nevertheless, the panel data results may still be biased if areas that experienced faster Internet growth also experienced other changes that resulted in longer flight times. For example, an increase in local Internet use could lead to lower prices, which may result in more flights operating at the local airport. This additional air traffic may translate into congestion and longer flight times. Thus, our Internet estimates may capture the impact of the Internet on the number of aircraft operations and airport congestion.
There are three main reasons why we think this concern is mitigated in our study. The first is that our data include direct measures of aircraft and airport operations. In the regressions that follow, we include a wide range of flight and airport congestion variables that are supposed to control for changes in the level of operations from each airport (X C in the regression below). In particular, we include the number of departures and arrivals at the flight's destination airport within an hour of the flight's arrival; the number of departures and arrivals at the flight's origin airport and, separately, at the flight's destination airport on that day; the number of departures and arrivals at the flight's origin airport within an hour of the flight's departure; and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) at the flight's origin airport and destination airport. The airport HHI measures should reflect potential situations in which airlines operating in concentrated airports gain advantages in handling flight operations and avoiding delays. Second, our empirical strategy implies that we are comparing the effect of the Internet on flights that depart from the same airport but carry different fractions of passengers who bought their tickets online. Thus, while aircraft operations at the origin airport are likely to affect flights that depart from that airport similarly, our analysis focuses on the effect of the Internet, which was, at least partially, determined elsewhere. The third reason we do not think that congestion or other unobserved factors correlated with Internet penetration are driving the results is our findings regarding flights with the fastest scheduled times and the effect of low-cost carriers on flight duration. It is difficult to see why congestion should affect the fastest flights more than other flights on the same segment. Likewise, it is unclear how airport congestion is related to our finding that the effect of the Internet on markets in which low-cost carriers operate is smaller than its effect in other markets.
To control for other socioeconomic changes at the metropolitan-area level, we also include the following demographic variables (X D in the regression below): metropolitan-area population, level of unemployment, and average per capita income. These variables are included in order to control for both short-and long-run variations in demand growth across airline segments and thus are constructed from the metropolitan-area data in the same way as the Internet penetration variable is constructed. Importantly, we also include a set of fixed effects that are supposed to capture any unobservable changes along the carrier, regional, and time dimensions. Below we further explain how the inclusion of these fixed effects can help us identify the effect of the Internet on scheduled and actual flight times.
A. Main Specification for Scheduled Flight Time
The basic framework for the analysis is a fixed-effects regression,
where an observation is a flight f of airline i on directional segment j departing from airport k on date t. Y fijt is an outcome measure of interest measured in minutes. The primary independent variables are the measure of Internet penetration (IP ijt ) and the interaction between this measure and the competition level, measured by the HHI for the corresponding flight segment (IP ijt Â HHI jt ). We also add the segment's HHI, measured based on the share of each carrier's flights on a segment, as a separate regressor.
To control for unobservables, we include the following set of fixed effects: directional segment, aircraft type, carrier/ date, and airport/carrier fixed effects. The directional segment fixed effects, a j , control for time-invariant airport-pair characteristics, such as distance, the flying direction, and landing and departing conditions for each segment. The aircraft-type fixed effects, h act , account for unobservable technical differences among different aircrafts that may allow aircrafts to fly at different speeds and recover lost time differently during flight. By including the carrier/date fixed effects, d it , we account for seasonal, technological, and other trends that may affect airlines' tendency to change their schedules. We allow this effect to differ across airlines. Hence, for example, if American Airlines implemented a nationwide change in its schedules whereas United did not implement such a change, then these carrier/date fixed effects should control for that. In the regressions in which we use measures of actual flight times as the dependent variable, these carrier/date fixed effects may also capture unobservable events that have different effects on different airlines on a given day, such as extreme weather conditions that generate ripple effects on a carrier's entire network performance. Including the carrier/date fixed effects implies that our cross-sectional variation comes from comparing two flights by the same carrier on the same day. In general, these two flights can depart from the same or different airports (e.g., one Delta flight from Salt Lake City and another Delta flight from Chicago). Still, such a comparison across airports may not be completely accurate. There are many unobserved differences across airports that may affect airlines' incentives to adjust their scheduling decisions. If these factors, such as the number of gates a carrier leases or the scale of operations in a particular airport, are correlated with the growth of Internet use in the area that the airport serves, then we may obtain biased Internet estimates. To control for such bias, in some specifications we also add airport/carrier fixed effects, l ki , which should capture unobserved differences across carriers that operate in the same airports. Hence, in these latter specifications, we test whether differences in the fraction of passengers who likely purchased their flights online affected scheduled elapsed flight times on the same carrier's flights on the same day, on the same type of aircraft, and originating from the same airport (e.g., comparing a Boeing 727 Delta flight from Atlanta to Boston with a Boeing 727 Delta flight on the same day from Atlanta to Albuquerque).
Two key features of the airline industry allow us to strengthen this identification strategy even further. The first is that airlines face different levels of competitive pressure across different segments originating from the same airport. This implies that the identification of the effect of the Internet on an airline's flights from the same airport and the same day comes at least partially from comparing flights by the same airline that depart from the same airport on the same day but in different competitive environments. We expect that the effect of the Internet on flight duration will be greater in markets in which airlines were more likely to use flight duration times as means to sell tickets. The second feature that can help identify the differential effect of the Internet on an airline's flights (same airport, same day, same aircraft) is that these flights likely carry different fractions of passengers who purchased their tickets online. This occurs because of the hub and spoke network structure of the airline industry. The network structure implies that many of the passengers who, for example, depart on a Delta flight from Atlanta actually began their journeys in different airports in different metropolitan areas. The share of connecting passengers is substantial. Ater (2012) reports that more than 50% of the passengers at the seventeen largest U.S. hub airports are using these airports to connect to other flights. Our weighted Internet variable reflects this feature of the airline industry and our assumption that passengers who purchase their tickets online do so in the areas where they begin their trips. Consequently, our comparison across an airline's flights from the same airport on the same day does not necessarily imply that we are comparing flights that carry passengers living in the same metropolitan area and have similar levels of access to the Internet.
This discussion also applies to the actual flight time measure as well as the measure of flight delays (see section IIIA).
B. Presence of Low-Cost Carriers and Business versus Nonbusiness Flights
We claim that the Internet changed the way airlines compete, making the flight duration characteristic less important 185 THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNET ON PERFORMANCE AND QUALITY than it was when brick-and-mortar travel agents booked most flight tickets. Another way to examine this argument is to investigate the relationship between Internet access and scheduled elapsed flight time under alternative competitive market conditions. To do so, we exploit two main characteristics of the airline industry. First, we investigate how scheduled elapsed flight times differ between segments in which low-cost carriers operate and those in which such carriers do not operate. Our conjecture is that legacy airlines are more likely to compete on scheduled elapsed time in segments in which low-cost carriers do not offer service. This is both because the presence of low-cost carriers already alters the nature of competition toward price competition (Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008) and because low-cost carriers, such as Southwest Airlines, the largest and most successful low-cost carrier, historically have not relied on traditional computer reservation systems to sell tickets. Specifically, we test whether scheduled elapsed times are longer for flights in segments where a low-cost carrier operates and whether the magnitude of the effect of the Internet on scheduled elapsed flight times is smaller in these segments. Thus, we estimate again equation (1) and add a dummy variable for whether a low-cost carrier operates on a given segment and its interaction with Internet penetration.
Second, in a separate specification, we distinguish between flights that are more versus less likely to carry business passengers. Our hypothesis is that airlines are particularly interested in attaining short scheduled flight times when they can increase their sales to business passengers. We consider two alternative definitions for business flights. First, we define business flights as those that depart between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., and, second, we consider the flights that connect the thirty largest U.S. cities as business flights (Gerardi & Shapiro, 2009 ). We enhance the base specification by adding a dummy variable for morning flights, a dummy variable for segments from or to airports in the thirty largest cities, and their interactions with the variable for Internet penetration. Adding these two dummy variables, along with the set of fixed effects introduced above, implies that we are now exploiting two additional sources of variation: the distinction between morning versus nonmorning flights operated by the same carrier on the same day and the same segment, as well as the distinction between flights heading to large versus nonlarge cities. We conjecture that before the Internet became highly accessible, morning flights heading to larger cities were likely to be shorter than nonmorning flights heading to nonlarge cities and that this difference declined once more passengers started using the Internet to purchase airline tickets.
C. Including Price as a Control Variable
In additional specifications we also include as a separate control variable the logarithm of each airline's average airfare on a given flight segment in the corresponding quarter.
We expect prices to fall as more passengers gain Internet access, and this fall may lead airlines to schedule longer flight times. By including the airfare variable, we aim to isolate the two channels through which the Internet may have affected scheduled flight times: first, by affecting the way airlines compete with each other, making flight duration a less important means to sell tickets, and second, by creating downward pressure on prices and indirectly affecting airlines' incentives to arrive as fast as possible at their destination. If our argument that the Internet changed the mode of competition in the airline industry holds, then we expect that the coefficient on Internet variables will be significant and large also when we include the average price as a control variable in the regression analysis.
7 Adding the airfare raises endogeneity issues. Passengers may care about both price and scheduled elapsed flight times, and an airline may jointly determine the price and elapsed flight time. To address this concern, we adopt an instrumental variable approach, exploiting the variation in prices offered by the same airline on markets with similar characteristics. Specifically, we use the airline's average segment fare on all other segments of similar length (we divide segments into five quintiles according to length). This instrument is similar in spirit to the instruments adopted by Nevo (2001) and other studies that use data from different geographic markets. Following the increase in scheduled flight durations, airlines should consider adjusting their corresponding actual flying times. Notably, while passengers with online access can observe the scheduled flight duration at the time of purchase, the actual flight duration is observable only on arrival at the destination airport. The difference in the transparency of these two flight attributes might drive airlines to increase actual flight times more than the corresponding increase in scheduled duration. This claim is particularly relevant as long as the difference in the two measures does not affect an airline's on-time performance statistics. 9 We directly examine this conjecture. First, we examine whether actual flying times indeed increased as more passengers gained Internet access. Second, we investigate whether this 7 This approach requires that the relationship between the average price and flight duration has certain properties that are not necessarily met. To further investigate the robustness of our approach, in separate analyses presented in the online appendix, we verified that including nonlinear price terms does not affect our results. 8 In the regressions in which we study the relationship between the presence of a low-cost carrier in scheduled elapsed flight times, we modified our definition of instruments: when calculating the airline's average segment fare on all other segments of similar length, we distinguish between segments where low-cost carriers are present and segments where lowcost carriers are not present. 9 The U.S. Department of Transportation publishes monthly statistics on airlines' on-time performance. A flight is considered on-time if it arrives no more than fifteen minutes after its scheduled arrival time.
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increase is greater or smaller than the increase in scheduled flight times. In other words, we investigate the relationship between Internet access and flight delays, that is, the difference between actual flight times and scheduled flight times. In these regressions, we also add the following aircraftflight-level variables: (a) an aircraft's arrival delay (in minutes) on its previous flight, (b) the scheduled buffer time (in minutes) between a given flight's scheduled departure and the scheduled time of its corresponding aircraft's previous arrival, (c) a variable that represents the number of flights a given flight's aircraft has performed on a given day prior to the flight under consideration; and (d) an airline's average load factor. In the instrumental variables regressions in which we use the load factor variable, we control for its potential endogeneity by using the average load factor in segments with similar lengths as instruments. Notably, omitting any or all of these additional variables does not qualitatively affect our results.
E. The Shortest Scheduled Elapsed Flight Times
To buttress the interpretation that the growth of online distribution channels has changed the competition mode in the airline industry, we also analyze the relationship between Internet access and the shortest scheduled elapsed flight time on a given segment. The effect of the Internet on scheduled flight times is likely to be greater for the flights with the shortest scheduled times, as these short times were presumably set in an effort to be displayed at the top of the travel agents' screens in the pre-Internet era. To study the effect on the shortest scheduled elapsed time, we estimate the following fixed-effects regression,
where an observation is a directional segment-date pair, and Y jt is the shortest scheduled elapsed flight time. IP jt is the average of the Internet penetration variables across the flights that operate on segment j on a particular date t. The demographic variables, X D jt , are obtained by taking the average of the demographic variables across the carriers that operate on the segment. The congestion measures X C jt correspond to the number of flights that depart from and arrive at the origin and destination airports. The fixed effects include segment fixed effects, a j , and date fixed effects, d t . To alleviate concerns regarding the effect of entry or exit into segments with few flights or into segments with longer or shorter flight distance, we restrict the analysis to segments in which at least five flights operated on each day included in our sample.
IV. Results

A. Scheduled Flight Time Measures
We report the results using scheduled flight time as the dependent variable in table 4. The coefficient of the Internet variable in our base specification presented in column 1 is 4.2 and is highly significant, suggesting that airlines scheduled longer flights as Internet access among passengers increased. The HHI variable is positive and significant, consistent with our claim that airlines compete using scheduled elapsed flight times. The coefficient on the interaction term Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Standard errors are clustered within a segment. Additional control variables are described in the text.
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between Internet penetration level and HHI is negative and significant, suggesting that most of the effect of Internet penetration on scheduled elapsed time occurs in competitive markets. This finding lends support to our claim that airlines relied less on scheduled elapsed flight times to differentiate themselves as more passengers used the Internet to purchase airline tickets. Thus, the effect of the Internet on scheduled duration of flights from San Francisco International Airport to JFK International Airport in New York is considerably greater than its impact on flights that operate in a less competitive environment market such as the San Francisco-St. Louis market. Adding the fare variable in column 2 is associated with a small decline in the magnitude of the Internet coefficient estimates, although both variables are statistically significant. We obtain similar results when we control for the potential endogeneity of the price variable in column 3. As expected, in all specifications, the coefficients that correspond to the number of flights departing from and arriving at the origin and destination airports within the same hour of the respective flight are positive and statistically significant. For example, our results suggest that the addition of thirty flights that depart within the same hour is associated with nearly two additional minutes in scheduled time. In columns 4 to 6, we present the regression results of similar specifications except that we also include the airport/carrier fixed effects. As seen in table 4, the magnitude of the Internet coefficient decreases by about 20%, but it is still positive and significant. The estimate for the coefficient of the HHI slightly increases, and the magnitude of the coefficient of the Internet and HHI interaction term barely changes. In fact, the coefficients for the Internet variable and for the Internet and HHI interaction term suggest that the effect of the Internet on flight duration is marginally negative for monopolistic markets.
B. More on Scheduled Flight Time Measures
Low-cost carrier presence. Table 5 reports estimation results for the analysis that examines the relationship between Internet access and the scheduled duration of legacy carriers' flights when a low-cost carrier either offers or does not offer service on the same segment. The coefficient of the low-cost carrier dummy variable indicates that flights by legacy carriers are more than 2 minutes longer in segments in which low-cost carriers operate than in segments in which low-cost carriers do not operate. According to our interpretation, in these markets, legacy carriers focus on the price dimension, and hence their scheduled elapsed flight times are relatively longer than in other flight segments. As passengers gained Internet access and price became more important in all markets, the distinction between the two types of markets disappeared.
Business and nonbusiness flights. Table 6 reports the estimation results that exploit our proxies for business and nonbusiness flights. The results are consistent with our hypothesis concerning the effect of the Internet on business versus nonbusiness flights. In particular, the regression results suggest that morning flights used to be, ceteris paribus, shorter than nonmorning flights (the difference is approximately 1 minute) and that as more passengers gained Internet access, this difference disappeared. These Changes in the shortest scheduled flying time. Table 7 presents the regression results using the shortest scheduled elapsed flight time on a segment on a particular day as the dependent variable.
11 In column 1, we include only the Internet variable and segment fixed effects. The estimate on the Internet coefficient, 7.57, is large and highly significant. In column 2, we add the HHI variable and its interaction with the Internet variable. The coefficient on the Internet variable increases, and, as before, we find that the effect of the Internet is considerably larger for more competitive segments. The magnitude of the Internet coefficient declines when we add date fixed effects and additional controls in columns 3 and 4, but it is still large and significant. The estimates of the HHI coefficient are positive and large, and their magnitudes are 2.5 times larger than those of the HHI coefficients shown in table 4, in which we use the scheduled elapsed flight time as the dependent variable. The magnitudes of the coefficients in table 7 suggest that when few passengers had Internet access, the shortest scheduled flight time dropped by more than 3 minutes once the market structure changed from a monopoly to an equal-size duopoly. As Internet access became more available to passengers, however, a similar change in market structure resulted in a considerably smaller effect-about 0.5 minutes-on the shortest scheduled flying time.
We also performed similar regression analyses for other measures of flight times on a given segment: 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and maximum flight times. (See the online appendix for the regression results.) Consistent with our interpretation, compared with the flights with the shortest flying time, the effect of the Internet on scheduled flying time was somewhat smaller for the 25th percentile and median flight times and was not significant for the 75th percentile and the maximum flight times.
C. Results Using Actual Flight Times and Delays as Dependent Variables
Actual flight times. Table 8 shows the results for the analysis using the actual flight time as the dependent variable. We compute this measure as the time elapsed between the scheduled flight departure time and the actual arrival time. According to the results from column 1, an increase of 0.2 in Internet penetration, which roughly equals 1 standard deviation for this variable, 12 is associated with an increase in actual flight time of between 1.0 and 2.9 minutes, depending on the level of competition. Accordingly, the overall effect of the Internet, which grew between 1997 and 2007 from 0.194 to 0.763 (see table 1), amounts to between 2.6 and 8.2 minutes in actual flight times, depending on the level of competition.
Arrival delays. Our results suggest that both the scheduled and actual flight times increased as more passengers Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Standard errors are clustered within a segment. Additional control variables are described in the text.
10 These and other results hold if instead of Thursdays in each quarter in each year in our sample, we consider Mondays or Tuesdays. Furthermore, these results also hold if we add airport/carrier fixed effects to the regression analysis. Although the effect we find on the difference between business and nonbusiness flights is not large, we believe that given the expansive set of fixed effects in our regressions, any effect is indicative of the presence of the relationship.
11 To verify that these results are insensitive to the exclusion of flights by small carriers, we use the OAG data in this regression analysis. The regression results remain qualitatively the same if we use the on-time performance data instead of the OAG data. gained Internet access. Table 9 shows the estimation results for the relationship between the Internet and flight delays, measured as the (positive or negative) difference in minutes between a flight's actual time of arrival and its scheduled time of arrival at its destination. The estimates for the Internet coefficient are positive and significant in all specifications, suggesting that flight delays have increased as more airline passengers have gained access to the Internet. Notably, delays have increased even though airlines have been scheduling longer flight times. A possible interpretation for this result is that as more passengers gained Internet access, airlines preferred to downgrade the quality of the less transparent flight attribute (flight delay) rather than to excessively pad scheduled flight durations. Alternatively, airlines Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Standard errors are clustered within a segment. Additional control variables are described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Standard errors are clustered within a segment. Additional control variables are described in the text.
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may have been looking for ways to reduce operational costs and allocated fewer resources to ensure that flights arrive on schedule. 13 This incentive to reduce costs is arguably greater for flights that serve relatively many passengers with Internet access. The estimates for HHI coefficients are positive but not always statistically significant at standard significance levels. The positive competition coefficients suggest that although airlines maintained shorter scheduled elapsed times on more competitive segments, they were nevertheless able to achieve shorter delays for these flights. The interaction term between the Internet variable and HHI is negative and highly significant. This finding suggests that delays increased more in more competitive environments because in these environments, airlines responded more aggressively to the change in the mode of competition.
Our results imply that an increase of 0.2 in Internet penetration among the passengers on a given flight is associated with an increase of slightly more than 2 minutes in arrival delays. This represents a 24% increase in arrival delay time compared with its average level. For monopolistic segments, an increase of 0.2 in Internet penetration is associated with an increase of 0.8 minutes in arrival delays. Our competition estimates also suggest that the net effect of competition on flight delays depends on passengers' access to the Internet. While in the low Internet environment our estimates suggest that more competition is associated with fewer delays and better quality, this relationship may change as passengers gain more Internet access.
The coefficients on the numbers of operations at the origin and destination airports are positive and statistically significant, as expected. The coefficients for other variables (not reported in table 9) are consistent with our expectations: a longer arrival delay for the previous flight on the same aircraft is associated with a longer delay for the given flight, while a longer scheduled time between a given flight's departure and the arrival of the previous flight on the same aircraft is associated with a shorter arrival delay for the given flight. Finally, a flight that takes place later in the day (as measured by the Flight in Day variable) is associated with a longer arrival delay. In column 2, we add the logarithm of a given airline's average fare on a given segment in a given quarter. The coefficient on average fare is negative and statistically significant, supporting theoretical models predicting that decreases in search costs could lead to decline in quality (Rogerson, 1988; Dranove & Satterthwaite, 1992; Fishman & Levy, forthcoming) . The results do not change qualitatively when we account for potential endogeneity of fares in column 3. The coefficient on the Internet penetration variable is still positive and significant. We obtain similar results in columns 4 to 6 when we include also the airport/carrier fixed effects.
D. Robustness
To further examine the robustness of our findings, we performed several analyses. The results of these analyses and additional results mentioned in the text are reported in the online appendix. For instance, we experimented with several nonlinear functions of prices and verified that the results are unaffected. We also found that in most specifications, the Internet variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient even if we exclude the interaction term between the Internet and competition variable. We also reran our regressions to include all airlines that reported on-time performance statistics to the U.S. Department of Transportation (instead of including only airlines that reported on-time performance throughout the entire period studied). The results we obtained were qualitatively the same. We also ran the regressions separately for earlier and later time periods. These regressions suggest that most of the effect of the Internet on scheduled elapsed flight times took place between 1998 and 2007. We also verified that our results remained unchanged when we used flights from other days of the week or for flights performed between the largest 75 airports instead of the top 100 airports. In addition, to alleviate concerns that the results are driven by changes in the weights that are part of our measure of Internet access rather than by changes in Internet penetration at the MSA level, we fixed the weights based on the total number of passengers in each route between 1997 and 2007. We then reran the regressions with the fixed weights. The results remained qualitatively and quantitatively the same. An additional concern is that the HHI variable could be endogenous. Therefore, we also ran instrumental variable regressions where we used as an instrument the lagged HHI values on the same segment. Again, the regression results remained qualitatively the same. We also verified that our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the late arrival and the scheduled buffer variables. One might be concerned that the scheduled buffer variable is under the control of the airline, and hence is potentially endogenous. Yet excluding these variables does not qualitatively change our results. Finally, we verified that the significance of coefficients is not affected when we cluster the standard errors at alternative levels, such as at the origin/ date level.
V. Alternative Explanations
Our findings uncover strong positive correlation between Internet access and various flight time measures. We argue that this association is driven by a change in the mode of competition in the airline industry, making the flight duration be a less important means to sell tickets. Throughout 13 We also explored whether the increased actual time is driven by longer departure delays, measured as the elapsed time between the actual gate pushback time and the scheduled departure time. This additional test is important because airlines are likely to have more control over delays occurring on the ground before departure compared to the flight airtime. The regression results, presented in the online appendix, suggest that departure delays are significantly higher for flights on segments in which larger shares of passengers have Internet access. This difference is greater in competitive markets.
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the paper, we mentioned why we think other alternative explanations are less probable. In this section, we reiterate the main alternative explanations.
A. Effect of the Internet on Airport Congestion
An increase in Internet use could lead to lower prices, which may result in more flights operating at the local airport. This additional air traffic may translate into congestion and longer flight times. Thus, our Internet estimates may capture the impact of the Internet on the number of aircraft operations and on airport congestion. We believe that this mechanism is unlikely to capture the impact of the Internet for three main reasons. As we explained in section III, we include several variables that represent the scale of operations at the origin and destination airports. Our regression estimates indeed indicate that these variables have a sizable effect on flight duration. The inclusion of these variables, however, implies that our Internet variables are capturing a mechanism that is not driven by the number of airport operations. Second, our identification strategy implies that we compare the effect of the Internet on flights departing from the same airport but carry passengers who purchased their tickets elsewhere, that is, in areas with different levels of access to the Internet. Finally, it is unclear how this alternative explanation is consistent with our findings that flight times in more competitive markets and on flights with the shortest time have increased more than on other flights.
B. Trade-Off between Price and Performance
The Internet enabled air passengers to sort flights by price and consequently induced airlines to set lower prices. Airlines, facing lower margins per passenger, may choose to allocate fewer resources to ensure shorter flight times. We agree that this argument has merit, and our findings support this argument. Nevertheless, the fact that we obtain strong positive correlation between Internet and scheduled flight duration even when we control for the price variable indicates that other channels through which the Internet affected scheduled flight duration are also important. Including price terms nonlinearly (see the online appendix) does not change these results. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how this alternative explanation relates to our other findings, for instance, that elapsed scheduled times in markets in which low-cost-carriers operate were affected less than in other markets.
C. Visibility of On-Time Performance Statistics
As Internet penetration across the United States has increased, statistics on flight delays and on-time performance have become more readily available to passengers through various sources, such as online media sources, online travel agencies, and the U.S. Department of Transportation website.
Arguably, airlines may pad their schedules in order to improve their on-time performance statistics, especially for passengers who likely purchase their tickets online. We do not think that this alternative explanation poses a real threat for our argument for a few reasons. First, to improve ontime performance statistics, airlines should also reduce, or at least maintain, their flights' actual flight times. However, as our estimates show, actual flight times have increased, especially for flights with a higher share of passengers who purchased their tickets online. Consistent with this view, in a separate analysis reported in the online appendix, we measure delays using the definition used by the Department of Transportation to compute airlines' on-time performance statistics. In other words, we use as a dependent variable a dummy variable that equals 1 if the flight is late more than 15 minutes and 0 otherwise. In this analysis, we do not find that the Internet is associated with fewer delays. Second, this alternative explanation cannot explain the different magnitudes of the relationship between Internet access and the shortest flight on a given market. Similarly, it is unclear how such an explanation is related to our finding on business flights. Third, on-time performance statistics are measured at the carrier level. Hence, carriers that try to improve their statistics can do so at any of their network flights; they need not focus on the flights that serve passengers with Internet access. The fact that these passengers have better access to on-time performance statistics does not mean that improvements in on-time performance need to be achieved for the flights that they take.
To sum up, we acknowledge that the Internet has led to reduced use of traditional travel agents, better airfare information, and better information about flight delays. While separately quantifying these three effects is not possible, our findings imply that the Internet led to increased flight times through the first two channels.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
Empirical research and competition policy tend to focus almost exclusively on price setting, making relatively little progress studying the effect of competition and information on nonprice attributes. In this paper, we address this gap by examining the effect of the Internet on performance and product quality in the airline industry, using scheduled elapsed flight times as our main measure for flight performance. Our empirical analysis provides evidence that increased Internet use led to longer scheduled elapsed flight times. This increase was most pronounced in flight segments in which legacy carriers competed with one another and among the flights with the shortest scheduled times. We argue that these findings can best be explained by a fundamental shift in the mode of competition in the airline industry, which rendered obsolete the use of scheduled elapsed flight times as a primary means to sell airfares. We also find that the actual flight times and flight delays have increased as more passengers gained Internet access.
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Taking a broader historical perspective on the U.S. airline industry, it is interesting to note that following its deregulation in 1978, airlines began competing on price at the expense of flight quality. More than twenty years later, the US airline industry experienced another dramatic change as passengers began using the Internet to search for and easily compare prices across airlines. In the search for ways to reduce costs and address the lower margins, legacy carriers considered abandoning their traditional business model in which passengers paid more in return for better service. Our findings suggest that airlines' response involved not only price cuts but also reductions in the quality provided to consumers and worse performance, especially in more competitive environments. Thus, our results suggest that the advent of the Internet, like the 1978 airline deregulation, led to lower prices and, at the same time, worse performance and lower flight quality. The magnitudes of effects we find are in line with findings of other studies that examined the relationship between market structure and airline performance. Mayer and Sinai (2003) look at the relationship between market structure and flight times. They find that flights from and to concentrated hub airports are 4.5 to 7.2 minutes longer. Forbes and Lederman (2010) look at the relationship between vertical integration and departure delays. They find that departure delays are 2.3 minutes shorter on normal-weather days and 5.6 minutes shorter on rainy days for integrated airlines than for nonintegrated airlines. This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first paper that examines whether increased access to information has a predominantly positive or negative effect on performance and product quality. Economic theory has long emphasized the importance of information for the efficient functioning of markets. Nevertheless, previous papers have typically explored how access to information affects prices and generally have not investigated other ways in which firms respond to these changes. Our findings-that the Internet had a negative effect on performance and product qualityprovide one such explanation. More generally, our findings that quality fell, together with previous findings that prices have fallen as Internet use has increased, could suggest that the effect of the Internet on consumers in the airline industry might be negative. Alternatively, it is quite possible that in the pre-Internet era, airlines were overproviding short flight durations. As passengers gained Internet access, they could choose flights that are better aligned with their preferences: lower prices in exchange for longer flights. In other words, the Internet enabled passengers to directly buy airfares, thereby mitigating potential agency problems created by the pre-Internet market institutional details and travel agents' incentives. Second, our paper contributes to the growing literature that investigates the effect of information and communication technologies on productivity and performance. Not surprisingly, the existing literature focuses on the large benefits associated with the adoption of information and communication technologies. Our findings, however, highlight a potentially negative effect of online distribution channels, which have indirectly reduced the incentives of airlines to compete on product quality. The results of this study are also related to other industries. In particular, in the context of online search, being on top of consumers' search results is considered important for online vendors because it translates into higher revenues. Our paper offers direct evidence on firms' response to changes in the criterion used to rank products.
